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Abstract  
 This paper presents a restatement of Keynes’s underemployment 
equilibrium as a center-equilibrium system. The authors present their central-
equilibrium underemployment model with the income-balancing mechanism. 
The authors postulate the existence of a causal link between the fundamental 
uncertainty and the center-equilibrium underemployment. Two channels of 
fundamental uncertainty are suggested here to capture this causal link, the 
capital channel and the money channel. Drawing upon Davidson (2009, p. 
333; 1991, p. 138), the authors identify the capital channel of fundamental 
uncertainty with the entrepreneurial risk and the money channel of 
fundamental uncertainty with the cash-flow-managerial risk of asset-liability 
mismatch. From this, the author infer a conclusion that the economic policy 
of flexible liquidity supply cannot be mixed up with an economic policy of 
governmental spending under a highly ambiguous term “money pumping”. 
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Introduction 
 The post-keynesian economics has been showing a long-run interest 
in the issues of equilibria of dynamic systems. In this direction of expansion, 
the post-keynesian research program could not have avoided a head-on 
confrontation with the natural-rate hypothesis which represents one of 
building blocks of neoclassical economics. Davidson refers to the 
“fundamental neoclassical article of faith” (Davidson, 1993, p. 312) in this 
context. In the capital market, the natural-rate hypothesis finds its 
manifestation in the natural rate of interest. As long as the money rate of 
interest falls short of the natural rate, the inflation rate is going to increase. 
This two-rate theory of Knut Wicksell (1898, pp. 102-121) became a 
theoretical foundation of the New Consensus monetary policy of inflation 
targeting. What if the capital market is not getting cleared by changes in the 
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interest rate, though? What if both the desire to invest and the desire to save 
are independent of the interest rate? (Keynes, 1936, p. 97, 135; 1937, p. 250). 
An introduction of such an assumption would inevitably explode the whole 
concept of the natural rate of interest and, in effect, the general-equilibrium 
paradigm of permanent market clearing.  
 In this paper, we are going to examine the causal links 
interconnecting the most significant building blocks of post-keynesian 
monetary economics. These building blocks are fundamental uncertainty, 
liquidity preference, criticism of the general-equilibrium assumption and 
criticism of Say’s law. We are going to discuss these elements with respect 
to Keynes’s underemployment equilibrium such as expounded in The 
General Theory (1936). We will put forward our restatement of Keynes’s 
underemployment equilibrium as a center-equilibrium system. Next, we will 
postulate the existence of a causal link between the fundamental uncertainty 
and this center-equilibrium underemployment.  Drawing upon the research of 
Davidson (1991, 2009, 2012), we will distinguish two channels – the capital 
channel and the money channel – through which the fundamental uncertainty 
results in the central-equilibrium underemployment. We will base our effort 
to describe the differences between these two channels on the distinction 
between the notion of negative net worth on the one hand and the bankruptcy 
(/insolvency) on the other hand. Drawing upon Davidson’s notions of 
“maintenance of one’s liquid status” (Davidson, 2009, p. 333) and  “certainty 
of cash flows (but not necessarily real outcomes) over time” (Davidson, 
1991, p. 138), we will identify the capital channel of fundamental uncertainty 
with the entrepreneurial risk and the money of fundamental uncertainty with 
the cash-flow-managerial risk of asset-liability mismatch. Finally, based on 
our hypothesis of two channels, we will show that an economic policy of 
flexible liquidity supply cannot be mixed up with an economic policy of 
governmental spending under a highly ambiguous term “money pumping”.   
 The first section of the paper provides an introduction of two 
theoretical foundations of neoclassical economics, the general-equilibrium 
theorem and Say’s law. In the second section, we present our two center-
equilibrium underemployment models, with the assumption of the natural-
interest-rate-clearing capital market and, in the other case, with the 
assumption of the income-balancing mechanism of the capital market. The 
third section focuses on Keynes/post-keynesian criticism of Say’s law 
through the income-balancing mechanism and from the liquidity-preference 
theoretical position. Our hypothesis of two channels of fundamental 
uncertainty is expounded at this place and the conclusions are drawn from it.  
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Say’s Law and General Equilibrium 
 Neoclassical economics is based on Say’s law. This principle, 
described by Jean-Baptist Say in the 18th century, explains why the idea of 
insufficient aggregate demand is erroneous. Whenever a good is produced, 
the factors of production used to produce this good are paid their 
remuneration, and so the aggregate value of all goods produced in an 
economy must be equal to the aggregate value of remunerations of factors of 
production which stand for the sum of all incomes. So, even though there 
may be markets with excess supply (the quantity produced exceeds the 
quantity demanded), there must be other markets with excess demand (the 
quantity demanded exceeds the quantity produced). Why? Because the 
system is closed.  
 This set-up changes substantially at the moment we accept the 
assumption that the subject can shift today’s consumption into future, in 
other words, if we built the possibility of saving into the model50. On the 
assumption that there are no intra-temporal exchanges and the money supply 
is constant, the condition of an inter-temporal closedness of a system 
consisting of n inter-temporal markets (actually, capital markets) can be 
expressed as follows: 
(YA)today+ + (YB)today+ + (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)  + (YB)tomorrow+ /(1+r)  = 
= (YA)today* + (YB)today* + (YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) + (YB)tomorrow*/(1+r)        (1) 
or 
[(YA)today+ - (YA)today* ] + [(YB)today+ - (YB)today*] =  
= [(YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) - (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)]+ [(YB)tomorrow*/(1+r) - (YB)tomorrow+ 
/(1+r)] 
(2) 
 In other words, the sum of today’s incomes and tomorrow’s incomes 
that the subjects A and B are endowed with has to be equal to the sum of 
today’s incomes and tomorrow’s incomes of the subjects A and B after the 
exchange. The exchange consists in that A saves a portion of his today’s 
income and lends it to B, so that B can increase his today’s consumption. But 
B will have to repay this loan to A with interest tomorrow.  
 What is the practical result of the above said? The practical 
consequence of the assumption of the inter-temporal closedness of a system 
is, as we could see, that all savings are consumed in the future. Or, vice 
versa, that all debts are repaid by future savings. However, since the future 
can be located to infinity, this assumption is more of theoretical than 
practical consequences. And, above all, this model does not incorporate the 
supply side of the economy. A’s savings are used by B to increase his 
today’s consumption. B’s willingness to pay an interest rate to A is co-
                                                          
50 We assume a simple two-period model as introduced by Fisher, 1930, pp. 38-45.  
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determined by his time preference. But what if B used these savings to 
increase the productive capacities which would make possible for him to 
repay the interest to A without being forced to reduce his consumption in the 
future period? What would be the interest rate he would be willing to pay to 
A? Definitely, any interest rate lower than the net rate of return from this 
investment. In that case, the assumption we made that the goods do not 
“grow” is not valid any more. Increased productivity resulting from the 
investment means that the amount of (some) goods tomorrow will be higher 
than today  
(YA)today+ + (YB)today+ + (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)  + (YB)tomorrow+ /(1+r)  < 
<  (YA)today* + (YB)today* + (YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) + (YB)tomorrow*/(1+r)  
(3) 
or 
[(YA)today+ - (YA)today* ] + [(YB)today+ - (YB)today*] <  
< [(YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) - (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)]+ (YB)tomorrow*/(1+r) - (YB)tomorrow+ 
/(1+r)] 
(4) 
where 
(YB)tomorrow*/(1+r) = (YB)tomorrow+/(1+r) + I.(1+η)/(1+r) - (ΔYA)tomorrow/(1+r) 
,(5) 
 where η is the productivity growth, which means that as for η > r 
(productivity growth rate higher than the interest rate paid to A), B’s future 
income will be higher thanks to the investment made.  
 The conclusion is that there is such interest rate r – provided the 
productivity growth rate η is known (!) - at which A will be willing to 
abstain from consumption of the value I which will make it possible to B to 
increase productivity (1+η)-times which ensures repayment of the interest to 
A and which ensures that B not only does not have to decrease his 
consumption in the future but he can even consume more (that is the 
meaning of the last inequality). On the other hand, the above said inequalities 
(3) and (4) be a question about the alleged closedness of this system. As long 
as a system is not described by equations, the problem of non-existence of a 
unique equilibrium prevails. How could this fly in the ointment be disposed 
of? Let us consider following. In retrospect, B knows that his investment 
lead to productivity growth and to increase of his income. Also, all of this 
had been expected by him before he did the investment, even though the 
precise numbers (namely, η) were not known to him. However, in a 
probabilistic sense, they were. Let us say that the risk of a bankruptcy had 
been estimated by him as a probability P. Then, though, we could 
incorporate the present value of this expected future income (with respect to 
the probability of a failure) and we could write from the ex post view: 
(YA)today+ + (YB)today+ + (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)  + (YB)tomorrow+ /(1+r) + I.η/(1+r) =  
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= (YA)today* + (YB)today* + (YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) + (YB)tomorrow*/(1+r).      (6) 
 Inserting the member I.η/(1+r) turned the inequality into an equality. 
On the other hand, the interpretation of such a step is inevitably that the 
exchange (A providing savings to B for interest, B doing an investment) does 
not change the real product. In other words, for a system to be closed, no 
operation can affect this size of the Edgeworth box. This closedness is not 
reached by assuming that the real output cannot increase – that would 
contradict both the facts and common sense – but, vice versa, by assuming 
that the real output had increased already. Any change affecting the size of 
the Edgeworth box is reflected before it happens. Any investment which will 
be done in the future is discounted to the present. This is more or less what 
the complete markets theory is about which is so strongly criticized by 
Davidson (2009, pp. 326-328).51 
 
General Equilibrium Revised  
A Center-Equilibrium Underemployment Model With the Natural Rate of 
Interest 
 The theory of general equilibrium (GE) sounds so plausible that it is 
very uneasy to escape it. All disequilibria will disappear through the process 
of market clearing. There is always a configuration of prices which will 
dispose of all excess demands and excess supplies. Yet, the cases of 
prevailing involuntary unemployment in many labor markets beg the 
question about the realism of the GE theory, nonetheless: “It is not 
surprising, therefore, that unemployment still plagues most 20th century 
economies, since neoclassical economists still formulate policy guidelines 
which are only applicable to a limited domain where agents choose "as if" 
they had specific and completely ordered knowledge about the future 
outcomes of their actions.” (Davidson, 1991, p. 137). The question to be 
asked here, is, then, what prevents the markets from getting cleared? Keynes 
noticed the wage rigidities but, unlike his followers who became called 
Keynesians, he did not regard these rigidities as the primary cause of 
unemployment.52 A second possible cause of malfunctioning of the market-
clearing mechanism is imperfect information. Imperfect information is just a 
special case of transaction costs. Except for imperfect information, another 
example can be transportation costs, legal costs and other bargaining costs. 
                                                          
51 “To some an assumption that the future is already known may seem preposterous. 
Nevertheless this idea underlies the Greenspan belief […] that the self interest of lending 
institutions in a free market should lead management to undertake transactions that protect 
shareholder’s equity.” (Davidson, 2009, p. 326). 
52 For the misperceived role of nominal-wage rigidities see the whole chapter 19 of The 
General Theory.  
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However, flow of time, technological progress and institutional progress 
eliminate these obstacles to the market-clearing process.   
 All these factors may slow down the market-clearing process but they 
do not present a fundamental obstacle to the theory of general equilibrium in 
the long run. However, this theory stands and falls on the assumption of the 
existence of a unique and stable equilibrium. A distinction must be kept in 
mind between uniqueness of an equilibrium, which regards the very 
existence of a single gravitational center, and its stability, which regards the 
question whether the system can reach its equilibrium automatically, or not 
(Jespersen, 2009, pp. 164-165).53 A dynamic system which possesses both a 
unique and stable equilibrium is a system of traditional equilibrium.54 If such 
a system is deviated from its equilibrium configuration, there is no external 
influence necessary for such a system to restore its equilibrium. The 
equilibrium of this system gets restored by operation of the system’s own 
endogenous dynamics. A system which possesses a unique but unstable 
equilibrium does not display such a characteristic. A dynamic system with a 
unique but unstable equilibrium – or a knife-edge equilibrium -  only stays in 
its equilibrium configuration if (and as long as) it is not diverted from this 
position. As soon as the system gets diverted from this position – even 
infinetisimally – a slight balance gets disturbed and the system starts a 
process of divergence. There is another type of a dynamic system, though, 
which possesses a unique equilibrium which the system cannot reach by its 
own but, at the same time, when it reaches it, it stays in this position. This is 
a center-equilibrium system. As long as the system’s parameters do not 
acquire the “right” values, the system will circulate along concentric orbits, 
unable to reach the equilibrium configuration by a mere operation of its own 
endogenous dynamics. To make the system reach its unique (but unreachable 
by endogenous forces) equilibrium, there has to be an exogenous force which 
helps the system get over the barriers of concentric orbits and brings it to its 
equilibrium.   
                                                          
53 To the problem of (non-)uniqueness in post-keynesian literature see e. g. Kaldor, 1934; 
Davidson, 1993; Setterfield, 1995, 1998a, 2008; Berger, 2009 and to the problem of 
(in)stability in post-keynesian literature see e. g. Kaldor, 1972; Amable, 1993; Setterfield, 
1997, 2005a.  
54 Setterfield, 1997, p. 52ff.; 2008.  
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Fig. 2. A Center-Equilibrium Underemployment Model With the Natural Rate of 
Interest (own source) 
 
 In the graph, we can see that despite the money market (M) and 
capital market (K) are in equilibrium at IRM1 and IRn1, respectively, the labor 
market is not at the real wage (W/P)1. We also can see that if the labor 
market gets cleared by a decrease in the real wages from (W/P)1 to (W/P)2, 
this will only lead to increase in the product which will move both the capital 
market and money market out of equilibrium.  
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Fig. 1. A Center-Equilibrium System (own source) 
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A Central-Equilibrium Underemployment Model Without the Natural Rate 
of Interest 
 What Keynes was criticizing, though, what not the mere fact that the 
economic system does not have to be a system with a unique stable 
equilibrium. Keynes’s critique of the neoclassical paradigm was substantially 
more profound. Take notice what the capital market is modeled like in the 
graph. Savings are a positive function of the interest rate and investments are 
a negative function of the interest rate. The equilibrium interest rate at which 
the subjects are willing to save and lend exactly the same amount which the 
firms are willing to borrow and invest is the equilibrium natural rate of 
interest IRn*. As a result, it is not possible that the willingness to save 
exceeds the willingness to invest in the long run. Excess supply of savings 
pushes the natural interest rate down. Analogically, excess demand for 
savings drives the natural rate up. Keynes put forward a radical revision of 
this model of a capital market. In his conception, the savings do not depend 
positively on the interest rate but depend positively on the income (Keynes, 
1936, p. 97). At the same time, the investment does not depend on the 
current interest rate but on the expected interest rate. The investment 
function itself is identical with a function of expected net marginal rate of 
return55 (Keynes, 1936, p. 136). Both the expected net marginal rate of return 
and the interest rate, to which the former one is compared, are subjects of 
fundamental uncertainty56. That means that they cannot be known even in the 
actuarial sense. However, if there is no relation either of the savings or the 
investment to the natural interest rate (whatever it is), then a change in the 
natural interest rate cannot be the mechanism of equilibrium restoration 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 165). As a matter of fact, there is nothing such as a natural 
rate of interest, then57. The neoclassical capital market scheme will then look 
like this: 
                                                          
55 Keynes uses a term “the marginal efficiency of capital”. 
56 Keynes talks just about certainty. The term “fundamental uncertainty” was probably 
introduced by Paul Davidson (see Jespersen, 2009, p. 178). 
57 Arestis (2009, pp. 16-18) points out a development in Keynes’s position as regards the 
natural rate of interest from The Treatise on Money – where he still subscribed to this 
concept – to The General Theory – where he rejected it. See Keynes, 1936, pp. 242-244.  
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 Is there any mechanism which can bring the willingness to save and 
the willingness to invest into balance? Since the savings depend positively 
on the income, the amount of savings generated and supplied would decrease 
with lower income to exactly the amount which corresponds to the 
willingness of firms to invest (which itself is given by animal spirits, i. e. 
fundamentally uncertain expectations). The general-equilibrium problem can 
be looked at like this, then: 
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Fig. 4. A Center-Equilibrium Underemployment Model Without the Natural Rate of Interest: An 
Economy With the Fundamental Uncertainty (own source) 
Fig. 3. Absenting Natural-Interest-Rate Balancing Mechanism in the Capital Market (own source) 
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 At the level of output Y1, both the capital market and the money 
market are in their respective equilibria but the labor market is out of 
equilibrium at the level of employment L1 and the real wage level (W/P)1. 
However, if the real wage decreases to (W/P)2, the labor market restores its 
equilibrium at the level of employment L2 but this level of employment will 
increase the output to Y2. At this level of output, though, the capital market 
will be out of its equilibrium. Excess savings in the labor market will 
motivate the firms to decrease their production back to Y1 which brings 
down the aggregate demand. However, the insufficient aggregate demand 
pushes down the prices which increases the real wages back to (W/P)1. At 
the higher wage level (W/P)1 the labor market is out of its equilibrium, again. 
A vicious cycle of falling nominal and real wages, falling prices, increasing 
real wages and again falling nominal and real wages, falling prices, 
increasing real wages etc. etc. with the product unable to provide the 
economy with a permanent full employment.  
 It is thus not the nominal wage rigidities which prevents the economy 
to reach full employment permanently but the fact that willingness of 
households to save is not accompanied by an equivalent willingness of firms 
to invest (Keynes, 1936, p. 262). In other words, the real culprit is an 
insufficient aggregate demand.58 Could a stimulation to aggregate demand 
ensure a permanently full employment, i. e. such a level of product which 
simultaneously restores the equilibrium in the labor market, the capital 
market and the money market? Let us assume the initial level of product Y1, 
again, at the level of employment L1 and the capital market being in a state 
of equilibrium at the level I=S(Y1). Now, the government increases the 
aggregate investment by G to the level I+G. The governmental investments 
increase the product directly from Y1 to Y3 and this increase is accompanied 
by an increase of labor demand. The shift in the labor demand increases the 
employment level from L1 to L3 at the unchanged real wage level (W/P)1. 
The full employment is restored and, at the same time, higher product 
increases the amount of savings generated to S(Y3) which is now equal to the 
level of the total of private desired and the governmental investments. The 
capital market restored its equilibrium. The money market equilibrium has 
not been affected. Thus, the full employment level is going to be permanent.  
 
Say’s Law Revised 
 Say’s law suggests the impossibility of a problem of deficient 
aggregate demand. Any production, as Say’s law implies, generates an 
equivalent flow of incomes to the factors of production, and – since the 
                                                          
58 For the misperceived role of nominal-wage rigidities see the whole chapter 19 of The 
General Theory.  
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system is closed – these incomes must either be consumed in the present 
(intra-temporal closedness) or saved to be consumed in the future (inter-
temporal closedness). If the incomes are saved to be consumed in the future, 
then, they must be invested in the present. In any case, the aggregate supply 
will equal the aggregate demand. This is the logic of a closed system which 
is an underlying principle of the Say’s law. The capital market can never face 
a situation of long-run excess savings because this would push the natural 
interest rate down. If we abandon this model of a capital market, the situation 
of excess savings may be a permanent problem. The system does not have a 
unique stable equilibrium and the markets don’t get cleared. As a matter of 
fact, not only the excess savings are not automatically accompanied by an 
equal desire to invest – which is a result we get in a classical model of a 
capital market thanks to a decrease in the natural interest rate to the market 
clearing level IRn* which guarantees this equality – but, the very opposite is 
true: the excess desire to invest will always find adequate savings. Keynes’s 
approach has obviously reversed this causality. According to his conception 
of a capital market, the savings are always generated automatically along 
with the investment made (Keynes, 1936, p. 184).  
 The reason why Keynes rejects a simple functional dependence of 
investments on the current interest rate is the existence of fundamental 
uncertainty. It is precisely the fundamentally uncertain characteristic of the 
world which is Keynes’s ultimate argument against the Say’s-law-based 
general-equilibrium economics describing the neoclassical world of 
permanently clearing markets. That a potential existence of a unique stable 
equilibrium is a general case being in opposition the special case of its 
guaranteed existence is a strong argument of Keynes. Such a theoretical 
standpoint would still remain a black box, though. There would still be 
missing a theory explaining why the absence of a unique stable equilibrium 
may be a more probable case. Besides, such a standpoint could be 
reconcilable with a world characterized by a fundamental certainty, as well. 
However, it is the fundamental uncertainty by which Keynes explains the 
non-existence of interest-rate balancing mechanism of the capital market. 
And it is the latter which serves as his theoretical explanation of his assertion 
that the non-existence of a unique stable equilibrium is the cause why the 
permanently full employment cannot be reached via a process of market 
clearing.  
 To sum up: the fundamental uncertainty of the world eliminates the 
natural-interest-rate balancing mechanism of the capital market and replaces 
this mechanism by the income balancing mechanism59; the income balancing 
                                                          
59 As soon as in The Treatise on Money, Keynes points out that the decision making of 
entrepreneurs to invest into fixed capital is separated from the decision making  of 
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mechanism implies that a desire to save may permanently exceed a desire to 
invest; this is a situation of insufficient aggregate demand which underlies 
the center-equilibrium underemployment model. We refer to this causal 
sequence as the capital channel of fundamental uncertainty. As mentioned 
above, the center-equilibrium nature of underemployment state is 
characterized by its feature of potential permanency. Unless the economy is 
affected by an exogenous force, it will not get out of the underemployment 
state. This implies, though, that such a system does not fulfill the condition 
of inter-temporal closedness such as defined above. The thing is that a 
certain amount of savings can stay not invested in the long run (!). The 
closedness of the system is then impaired: 
(YA)today+ + (YB)today+ + (YA)tomorrow+/(1+r)  + (YB)tomorrow+ /(1+r) + I.η/(1+r) > 
> YA)today* + (YB)today* + (YA)tomorrow*/(1+r) + (YB)tomorrow*/(1+r). 
(7) 
In other words, A saves a portion I of his today’s income 
(YB)today* = (YA)today+ - I,(8) 
 but B does not invest this sum. The aggregate demand falls short of 
the aggregate supply, a result contradicting the Say’s law.  
 What link inter-relates the reversal of the Say’s law resulting from 
the fundamentally uncertain nature of the world with money? Economic 
schools drawing upon the quantity theory of money regard money as a mere 
medium of exchange whose primary and, in effect, only function is reduction 
of transaction costs. As mentioned above, transaction costs are one of the 
sources of short-run frictions which prevent the economic system from 
reaching its state of general equilibrium via the process of market clearing. 
Money is one of the most powerful institutional devices which helps to 
reduce these obstacles to market clearing and to make the short run during 
which the frictions prevail as short as possible. However, the problem of 
transaction costs disappears in the long run. At that moment, though, the 
existence of money cannot be either justified or explained in the framework 
of neoclassical economics (Davidson, 1991, p. 137). Neoclassical models, 
then, express quantities in monetary values but, in their nature, they describe 
a barter economy where money is just a classical veil with neither long-run 
nor short-run effect on the real processes. It is only in the real world 
characterized by existence of fundamental uncertainty where the uncertainty 
cannot be expressed in terms of a probabilistic risk (non-ergodic world) 
where the money is of any meaning.60  
                                                                                                                                                     
households to save (Keynes, 1930, p. 123) but the income balancing mechanism appears as 
late as in The General Theory. 
60 For the post-keynesian perspective of the phenomenon of fundamental uncertainty see e. 
g. Lawson, 1988; Davidson, 1991; Setterfield, 1996; Deprez, 2001; O’Donnell, 2011; 
Jespersen, 2009; Dequech, 2008.  
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 Even though the future is fundamentally uncertain in most cases, the 
existence of money can reduce this uncertainty to a substantial degree. To 
understand this, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of financial 
failures, bankruptcy (or insolvency)61 and negative net worth. Negative net 
worth is a situation when the total of your liabilities exceeds the total of your 
assets. Bankruptcy (insolvency), to the contrary, is perfectly compatible with 
positive net worth, i. e. it can affect a subject which is completely sound and 
fit financially. However, an insolvent subject suffers from the so called 
asset-liability mismatch62, that is, the time structure of the subject’s assets is 
unfavorably matched to the time structure of his liabilities. Plainly speaking, 
such a subject suffers from insufficient liquidity, i. e. reduced “ability to 
meet [their] nominal contractual obligations when they come due” 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 138). As regards the uncertainty concerning the risk of 
negative net worth – which is a result of an entrepreneurial failure - there is 
not much the existence of money as such could do. But as regards the 
uncertainty resulting from the risk of becoming a victim of an asset-liability 
mismatch – which is a result of a failure in the cash-flow management, not 
an entrepreneurial failure - the money provides economic subjects with a 
powerful instrument of reducing this uncertainty substantially.63 A real 
tragedy of every financial end economic crisis is the amount of 
fundamentally solid firms which are unable to meet their commitments just 
because of adverse development of the time structure of their balance 
sheets.64 Despite their prosperity, such firms get in troubles because of lack 
of liquidity, they can’t pay wages because their customer, who also is short 
of liquidity, has not paid them yet. The employees who don’t get their wages 
in time cannot meet their commitments etc. What is a mere cash-flow 
problem, at the beginning, causes shut-down and lay-offs which implies a 
decrease in the real product and aggregate demand. These fluctuations 
intensify the already existing unavoidable uncertainty even more. Yet, this 
uncertainty could be pushed down considerably by providing the markets 
with sufficient liquidity (Davidson, 2012). Ironically, though, the asset-
                                                          
61 As a matter of fact, bankruptcy and insolvency are not synonyms, strictly speaking. While 
insolvency is a financial state of being, bankruptcy is a legal process. Even though 
insolvency does not have to imply bankruptcy, we do not regard is necessary to distinguish 
between these two terms, at this moment.  
62 A classic model is Diamond, Dybvig, 1983.  
63 “The social institution of money and the civil law of contracts enables entrepreneurs and 
households to form sensible expectations regarding the certainty of cash flows (but not 
necessarily real outcomes) over time.” (Davidson, 1991, p. 138). 
64 “For business firms and households the maintenance of one’s liquid status is of prime 
importance if bankruptcy is to be avoided. In our world, bankruptcy is the economic 
equivalent of a walk to the gallows. Maintaining one’s liquidity permits a person or business 
firm to avoid the gallows of bankruptcy.” (Davidson, 2009, p. 333).  
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liability mismatch (and uncertainty and fluctuations resulting from it) should 
not exist at all, in a general-equilibrium world ruled by market-clearing 
processes.65 Except that there are some markets which consist of a supply 
and a demand which are not inter-related via a price-changing balancing 
mechanism. As the example of the capital market above demonstrates, even 
one such market may undermine and explode the whole market-clearing 
structure of a general-equilibrium building.  
 To sum up: the fundamentally uncertain nature of the world implies 
that the risk of asset-liability mismatch is a phenomenon which does not 
disappear in the long run – unlike phenomena such as price rigidities, 
imperfect information or transaction costs, which can be neglected in the 
long run. The long-run nature of the asset-liability mismatch problem implies 
that entrepreneurs – under certain conditions – start to prefer liquidity to real 
investments. In that case a desire to invest (i. e. real investments) falls short 
of the desire to save which is tantamount to the aggregate demand falling 
short of the aggregate supply. The ultimate consequence is the center-
equilibrium underemployment model, again. We refer to this causal 
sequence as the money channel of the fundamental uncertainty. While the 
capital channel operates with the notion of excess savings, the money 
channel points out the notion of deficient real investment. At the first glance, 
the difference is but verbal. However, beyond this superficial identity, there 
is a substantial difference. Let us denote the amount of investment that the 
entrepreneurs are willing to make Ip. This level is given by the entrepreneurs’ 
expectations of the future rate of return. If the households wish to save more 
than this amount, then the capital market faces an excess supply of savings. 
The cause of the capital market imbalance does not go down to worsening 
expectations of the entrepreneurs but to increasing desire to save of 
households. A capital market disequilibrium can result from pessimistic 
expectations of the entrepreneurs regarding their respective future capability 
to meet their respective payment obligations. Notice that it is not a higher 
level of subjectively perceived risk of entrepreneurial failure which 
decreases the willingness of entrepreneurs to make real investments here. It 
is a risk of cash-flow managerial failure what they perceive now with a 
                                                          
65 Since any good has its own market which get cleared by a price change, so does any risk 
which is a good, too. A risk is traded in an insurance market where the demand side buys the 
insurance – willingness to pay being a function of individual expected losses – and the 
supply side, disposing of knowledge of the probability distribution of the event, sells it – the 
cost being a function of aggregate expected losses. Such market gets cleared by a change in 
the insurance premium. An asset-liability mismatch is an event the risk of which can be 
evaluated by an insurance market as any other risk. Davidson ads: “[The] need for check 
book balancing and desire for an additional liquidity cushion is an irrelevant concept for the 
people who inhabit the artificial world of classical economic theory where the future is risky 
but reliably predictable.” (Davidson, 2009, p. 333). 
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higher intensity. A reaction of entrepreneurs is an increased demand for 
liquidity and decreased demand for real investments, then. Could this 
perception of cash-flow managerial failure, i. e. asset-liability mismatch, be 
reduced or eliminated? Well, if the entrepreneurs knew that there is an 
orderly market which makes it possible for them to liquify their real 
investments for a price very close to that at which the last transaction was 
made at this market (definition of an orderly market), then their perception of 
the risk of cash-flow problems would be substantially reduced or eliminated. 
On the other hand, though, a willingness of the entrepreneurs to make real 
investments cannot be increased above the level of expected future rate of 
return by any degree of market orderliness.66 It is thus obvious, that an 
insufficient liquidity supply can be a severe catalyst of the fundamental 
uncertainty and bring about the center-equilibrium underemployment 
situation. Elimination of this uncertainty-catalyst via flexible liquidity supply 
cannot be mixed up with the governmental-spending way out of the center-
equilibrium underemployment caused by the excess desire to save under a 
highly ambiguous common term “money pumping”67. The former solution 
focuses on the problem of pessimistic expectations regarding the cash-flow 
(asset-liability mismatch), while the latter focuses on the problem of 
pessimistic expectations regarding the rate of return. While the former 
represents a cash-flow managerial risk, the latter represents an 
entrepreneurial risk.   
 
Conclusion 
 We made a short exposition of the neoclassical general-equilibrium 
framework by means of an intra-temporal and inter-temporal n-dimensional 
Edgeworth box apparatus. We  demonstrated the closedness of a system, 
separately for a non-productive and a productive economy. In the next 
section, we pointed out differences between three types of dynamic systems 
as to the nature of their respective equilibria: traditional-equilibrium system, 
knife-edge-equilibrium system and center-equilibrium system. Drawing upon 
the well-known fact that Keynes did not consider nominal-wage rigidities as 
the primary shortcoming in the general market-clearing process but the 
insufficient aggregate demand, we presented our restatement of Keynes’s 
underemployment equilibrium as a center-equilibrium system.  
 We continued our case by designing our center-equilibrium 
underemployment model that would be compatible with the existence of the 
natural rate of interest. Next, we presented  our center-equilibrium 
underemployment model where the natural-interest-rate balancing 
                                                          
66 A possible objection of moral hazard will be discussed in another paper.  
67 E. g. Mui, 2014.  
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mechanism is replaced by the income-balancing mechanism. We expressed 
our conviction that Keynes’s elimination of the natural interest rate in its 
capacity as the balancing mechanism of the capital market was a direct 
logical consequence of Keynes’s postulate of the fundamentally uncertain 
nature of the world. Since the elimination of the natural-interest-rate 
mechanism resulted in the insufficient aggregate demand as a general case 
and, in effect, lead to the center-equilibrium underemployment, we 
postulated the existence of a causal link between the fundamental uncertainty 
and the center-equilibrium underemployment. We call this particular 
causality the capital channel of the fundamental uncertainty. At the same 
time, we presented an alternative way how the fundamental uncertainty 
results in the state of center-equilibrium underemployment. We call this 
alternative way the money channel of the fundamental uncertainty and we 
see its modus operandi in the liquidity preference of entrepreneurs. If the 
world were fundamentally certain, there would be no money needed in the 
long run (Davidson, 1991, p. 137; 2009, p. 333). The existence of money in 
the long run cannot be explained in terms of reduction of transaction costs. 
The money is demanded even in the long run because of their liquidity since 
possession of liquidity reduces the risk of bankruptcy (Davidson, 1991, p. 
138; 2012). We claim that what Davidson means by “maintenance of one’s 
liquid status” (Davidson, 2009, p. 333) and  “certainty of cash flows (but not 
necessarily real outcomes) over time” (Davidson, 1991, p. 138) is an effort to 
avoid the asset-liability mismatch and to reduce the risk thereof. This risk 
does not disappear in the long run because it is a logical consequence of the 
existence of fundamental uncertainty. In case of a strongly perceived 
uncertainty regarding the future cash-flows, the demand for liquidity 
increases and the demand for investments into real capital decreases 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 139). This situation can prevail even in the long run. So, 
fundamental uncertainty leads to insufficient aggregate demand and, as a 
result, to the underemployment equilibrium.  
 From this hypothesis of two channels of fundamental uncertainty we 
draw the following conclusions: 1) both the capital channel and the money 
channel imply a breach of the inter-temporal closedness assumption because 
a certain amount of savings can stay not invested in the long run which 
implies that the aggregate demand falls short of the aggregate supply, a result 
contradicting the Say’s law; 2) while in the capital channel the insufficient 
real investment goes down to the risk of entrepreneurial failure, the former 
results from the cash-flow-managerial failure in the money channel; 3) an 
insufficient liquidity supply can be a severe catalyst of the fundamental 
uncertainty and bring about the center-equilibrium underemployment 
situation; 4) while the flexible liquidity supply tackles the problem of 
pessimistic expectations regarding the cash-flow (asset-liability mismatch) – 
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i. e. the cash-flow-managerial failure – the governmental spending tackles 
the problem of pessimistic expectations regarding the rate of return – i. e. the 
entrepreneurial failure. 
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